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Abstract
This paper suggests that contingent on the productivity level of the trade part-
ner; international trade may create resource misallocation in less productive
countries. It theoretically shows how the interaction between technology dif-
fusion induced by trade and cross sectoral heterogeneity in productivity dis-
tributions, and technology adoption rates leads to asymmetric pro-competitive
effects, which in turn result in misallocation. In this framework trade increases
welfare in the long-run due to technology diffusion, even though there is steady-
state resource misallocation across industries. Using firm level data from 32
European countries for the period of 1992-2007, it also presents robust empiri-
cal evidence supporting the model predictions by showing that trade with more
productive regions as a share of purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP (1) in-
creases economy wide markup variation, (2) raises mean sectoral productivity,
and (3) decreases productivity dispersion within 4-digit sectors, only in less
productive countries.
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1. Introduction
Efficient resource allocation is crucial in utilizing available input factors and
technology. When prices reflect true costs or price distortions are uniform, ef-
ficient allocation is achieved (Lerner (1934)). However, this link between costs
and prices can be tilted due to various factors such as distortionary taxes or lim-
ited access to finance which might lead to inefficient use of resources. Recently,
there has been an upsurge in the empirical studies documenting the presence
and extent of resource misallocation for developing countries (Banerjee and Du-
flo (2005), Jeong and Townsend (2007), Alfaro et al. (2008), and Hsieh and
Klenow (2009)). Hsieh and Klenow (2009) report that there could be large pro-
ductivity gains, in the magnitude of 40-60 % in India and 30-50 % in China, if
allocative efficiency is hypothetically improved to the US level. Similarly, using
firm level data for 79 countries, Alfaro et al. (2008) find that incorporating al-
locative efficiency in a neoclassical growth model improves the explained part
of the cross country dispersion in income per worker from 42 to 58 %. These
substantial figures indicate the importance of allocative efficiency in explaining
the formerly unexplained part of the productivity variation across countries.
An immediate query growing out of these observations relates international
trade and resource misallocation: How does the exchange of goods and ideas
interact with the allocative efficiency of trading countries? In this paper, we
explicitly focus on this issue and argue that the answer depends on the cross-
sectoral variation of monopoly power in autarky. If the economy is characterized
by monopolies facing little competitive pressure in autarky, international trade
leads to resource misallocation by affecting competitiveness of different sectors
asymmetrically even though it gradually eliminates the absolute level of market
power within each sector. This seemingly special case is not only of theoretical
interest but also accords well with the experience of transition economies which
were dominated by large establishments having considerable market power be-
fore integrating the world economy.
The mechanics behind this result can be summarized as follows: Interna-
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tional trade initiates exchange of goods and knowledge transfers among trading
partners. The knowledge transfers are unidirectional from more productive
countries (North) to less productive ones (South) in the form of spillovers from
which both the active southern firms (incumbents) and their potential competi-
tors (competitive fringe) can benefit.1 This knowledge diffusion decreases the
relative productivity of the southern incumbents with respect to their fringe
over time due to faster catch up of initially less productive firms. As a result,
average productivity increases while sectoral productivity dispersion is declining
and competition will be tougher once the economy moves into a period of trade
liberalism. The crucial elements which establish the link between international
trade and misallocation are the differences in initial productivity distributions
and technology adoption rates across sectors.2 In the presence of these dif-
ferences, trade will have asymmetric pro-competitive effects in the South and
inflate markup dispersion. More competitive sectors employ a larger share of
the laborforce for lower relative output prices; that is, they will be sub-optimally
large, and the markup dispersion will create resource misallocation which keeps
the laggard economy from its potential output, which is defined as the after-trade
output level with no markup dispersion.3
1Knowledge spillovers and technology diffusion are used interchangeably.
2While presence of only one factor is enough to create misallocation in the transition, long-
run level of allocative efficiency is determined by the cross-sectoral differences in technology
adoption rates.
3There are two alternative ways of determining the potential output. First, we can compare
the before and after trade values of relative output. In this case, the resultant effect of trade
liberalism on the international distribution of wealth is not trivial and determined by the
net effect of positive productivity gains and negative allocational effects of higher markup
variation. Second, we can define the potential output which is achieved by the laggard economy
when there is no markup variation under free trade and evaluate the effects of international
trade and markup heterogeneity with respect to this reference. In either case, there is room
for intervention and the adverse effects of resource misallocation can be - at least partly-
eliminated by careful trade and competition policies. In this study, we follow the second
alternative and compare the after-trade outcomes with and without markup variation since
long-run productivity gains from trade are likely to dominate the losses due to misallocation.
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It should be apparent that the mechanism described above predicts that
productivity of the trade partner is operative where openness due to trade with
high productivity regions, rather than the average openness, brings about pro-
competitive effects and associated welfare losses.
As preliminary evidence for our model predictions, Figure 1 shows the rela-
tionship between trade openness and variation in profit margins -a commonly
used measure for markups- for a large sample of European countries between
1992 and 2007.4 It is seen that trading more with high productivity regions
(US, Canada, Japan and Western Europe) implies higher markup dispersion
(left panel) whereas the increased share of trade with low productivity regions
(MERCOSUR members, Eastern Europe, North Africa and SACU countries)
suggests the opposite (right panel). These patterns are not explicitly investi-
gated so far in the literature and this study suggests a theoretical framework
to explain the observed relationship between the relative productivity of trade
partners and variation in profitability.
Our work is related to different strands of literature. First, this paper is
closely related to the recent literature on resource misallocation and aims to
provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence documented espe-
cially for developing economies (Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Jeong and Townsend
(2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). There are two regularities which can be
distilled from this body of empirical research: To explain the observed devia-
tions from an efficient firm size distribution (which is assumed to be US firm size
distribution), firm level distortions should be (1) positively related to firm pro-
ductivity and (2) negatively correlated with firm size (Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Banerjee and Moll (2010)). In this respect,
we argue that markups are self-created distortions by firms’ profit-maximizing
Hence, we point out that it can be crucial to couple trade liberalism with careful competition
policies to fully utilize the traditionally emphasized opportunities presented by free trade.
4The profit margin data are provided by Bureau van Dijk. Trade data comes from UN
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Figure 1: Productivity of the trade partner and variation in profit margins. highshare (low-
share) is the sum of merchandise imports and exports with the high (low) productivity region
as a share PPP GDP. sdprma is the standard deviation of profit margins. Each point is a
country-year pair. T-statistic for highshare (lowshare) is 3.91 (-5.43).
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behavior, which act as a wedge between marginal cost and prices. Trade creates
markup variation due to asymmetric pro-competitive effects across sectors and
firms imposing higher markups are observed to have higher revenue productiv-
ity while being smaller in size due to higher prices and lower demand for their
output. As a result, our model provides a rationale for the positive (negative)
relationship between firm level distortions and marginal revenue productivity
(size).
The prominent theoretical explanation in this literature is the imperfections
in financial markets. Buera et al. (2011) report that “a factor-of-two differ-
ence in income levels, or almost 80 % of the difference in per-capita income
between Mexico and US” can be explained by the differences in financial de-
velopment. Banerjee and Moll (2010) propose that credit constraints together
with a convex-concave production function give rise to misallocation but creat-
ing misallocation as a steady-state phenomenon is left as an open question to be
answered. Clearly, impediments against resource reallocation may cause misuse
of available factors and indeed these frictions are shown to be empirically impor-
tant. One of our contributions is to show that even when there are no frictions
against resource flow; misallocation may emerge due to pro-competitive effects of
international trade, heterogeneity in productivity distributions, and technology
adoption rates across sectors. Furthermore, our framework generates misalloca-
tion in the steady-state due to cross-sectoral variation in technology adoption
rates across sectors.
Being close to our argument, Epifani and Gancia (2011) contribute to the
discussion by stating that there can be pro-competitive welfare losses associated
with increased markup heterogeneity where the distortion is mainly created due
to asymmetric exposure to foreign competition. As a result, they use the second
moment of the openness distribution to explain the sectoral differences in prof-
itability. Complementary to their argument, we emphasize that productivity
distribution is heterogeneous across sectors and thereby there are natural differ-
ences across sectors in the way which they react to market integration. Hence,
even under complete liberalization, asymmetric effects emerge due to these sec-
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toral differences. Furthermore, we propose a specific mechanism -technology
diffusion- through which international trade affects the competition in the lag-
gard economies and provide novel predictions which call for the average openness
into the analysis, but this time in a specific manner. Namely, we predict that
the productivity gap between trade partners is an important ingredient of the
analysis and trading more with more productive regions may create misalloca-
tion for relatively backward economies. We also present robust empirical results
in support of our model predictions.
Second, this paper aims to contribute to the understanding of cross-country
convergence and international trade literature. We aim to provide useful insights
about two main questions of this line of research: How does the technological
progress in developed countries affect the productivity in the least developed
countries where there is no or limited innovative activity? Does exposure to
trade change the observed patterns in income differentials? Several papers
(among others Young (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Van de Klun-
dert and Smulders (1996), Coe et al. (1997), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001))
have discussed different mechanisms which may foster or prevent cross-country
convergence. Apparently, the changes in allocative efficiency introduced by
international trade have not been investigated explicitly. In this respect, we
propose that observed levels of convergence in real income might understate
the convergence in physical productivity levels due to trade induced misalloca-
tion. This argument can be helpful in understanding the lack of convergence
experienced by transition economies.
Another line of related research is on the incapability of CES utility func-
tions to create pro-competitive effects of international trade since the markups
are constant over time. Behrens and Murata (2007) show the importance of
using CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility functions to generate
variable markups. Among others, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) use a special
case of this type of utility functions to model the pro-competitive effects of in-
ternational trade. Remarkably, our model generates pro-competitive effects of
trade with CES utility as a consequence of the interaction between trade and
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sectoral heterogeneity in productivity distribution. Briefly, considering supply
side heterogeneity yields an intuitive relationship between trade and markup
distribution even when we abstract from the demand side arguments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section-2, the model
is presented and the effects of knowledge spillovers on markup dispersion and
relative output are discussed. In Section-3, the data are introduced and model
predictions are empirically tested. Section-4 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Model setup
We study a two country North-South model with fully integrated goods mar-
kets and no international factor mobility. There is a continuum of differentiated
goods whose measure is normalized to 1 in each country. The southern (north-
ern) goods are indexed by i, i ∈ [0, 1] (j, j ∈ [0, 1]). The elasticity of substitution
(ε > 1) is constant among domestic and foreign goods.5 The individuals’ utility
function is of the familiar CES form6
















where ci is consumption of good i. Consumers maximize their utility (1) with






cjpj dj = I, (2)
where pi is the price of the domestic good i and I denotes the income. Given
these conditions, domestic demand for the ith good will be
5We use domestic (foreign) country and the South (North) interchangeably.








where Px is the domestic price index. Similarly foreign demand for the domestic







where bars denote the foreign counterparts. Finally, total domestic and foreign















The domestic and foreign price indices are equal (Px = P̄x) since the markets
are fully integrated, transportation is costless and there is no pricing to market.
The price index will be our numeraire and is equal to 1. Hence, all variables are
in real terms.
2.1.1. Firm behaviour and productivity
Southern (Northern) firm i (j) uses a production technology with constant
returns to the only mobile resource labor with productivity hi, i ∈ [0, 1] (hj , j ∈
[0, 1]). Then, the output of firm i is given by
xi = hili ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
It is assumed that incumbent firms have the same productivity within each
region while the North has a higher aggregate productivity (
∫ 1
0
hidi = hi = H <
9




7 For each southern sector i ∈ [0, 1], there is a competitive
fringe which can produce the same good with a lower productivity (hfi < hi)
hence at a higher marginal cost. In addition, fringe productivities are allowed to
be different across sectors to model the cross-sectoral variation in productivity




schedules (3) and (4) and the fringe productivity in order to maximize the
present value of its cash flow stream, where w is the domestic wage rate. The
price of good i is equal to a constant markup (ε/(ε − 1)) times the marginal
cost as long as the fringe is not able to break even at this price. Otherwise, the
incumbent cuts down its price and equates it to the marginal cost of the fringe
















Northern incumbents always set the monopoly price since they are assumed to






∀j ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
2.1.2. Productivity growth: Spillovers
A northern firm invests in R&D and has a constant positive productivity
growth (ĥj = g ∀j ∈ [0, 1]) which is assumed to be exogenous. When the
markets are integrated, the South experiences productivity gains in the form
of technological knowledge spillovers. In the absence of these spillovers, the
South is assumed to have constant productivity. Hence, the innovative activity
7Symmetry of incumbent productivity is a simplifying assumption to make the exposition
clearer and not crucial for any of the qualitative results. It is used to crystallize that price
heterogeneity within a country, if exists, is not justified by the productivity differences of
operating firms. The general solution without incumbent symmetry is available upon request
from the author.
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of southern firms is assumed to be of negligible magnitude which causes their
productivity growth to be dependent on the aggregate productivity stock of the
trade partner. This mechanism is reflected in the law of motion of the labor
productivity for southern firms as follows
ḣi = γ1(H̄/hi)







θ , δ, θ, γfi > 0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1], (11)
where the dot indicates the time derivative.8 The spillover equations (10) and
(11) imply that the change in the productivity of the southern firms is increasing
in the productivity gap ( H̄hi ) and outside sector productivity stock is also effective
on the subsequent productivity growth since the frontier is determined by the
aggregate foreign productivity (H̄). This formulation is based on the available
empirical evidence on technology diffusion which we will present in section 2.3.
To find the evolution of relative incumbent productivity we define mi(t) ≡
hi(t)
hfi (t)


















∀i ∈ [0, 1], (12)
where
8Our formulation assumes that trade is a binary variable and trade volume has no effect
on the strength of the spillovers. This is a simplifying assumption to make the exposition
clearer. The positive relationship between spillovers and trade volume can be easily included
in our specification by defining δ as an increasing function of the trade openness, which is
defined for positive trade levels, without changing any of the qualitative results of our model.
Such a function should take positive values to be consistent with productivity convergence and
bounded from above to rule out the possibility of instantaneous catch up with the frontier. In
the empirical part, we follow the standard route in the empirical literature and use continuous


















)1/δ ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. (14)





< ε/(ε−1) ≤ mi(0), ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, relative incumbent
productivity monotonically decreases over time and converges to its long-run
value from above. One key point about equation (14) is that the sectors, where
the foreign knowledge can be easily replicated and implemented will be more
competitive in the long run. This observation is pertinent to predict which
sectoral characteristics influence the economy wide variation in trade induced
price distortions.
Before presenting the details of the model solution, we may reflect more
on an empirically relevant implication of the sectoral spillover equations. It is
apparent that your trade partner matters: the initial productivity level of the
trade partner is important in determining how large the pro-competitive effects
will be, especially in the short run:
∂mi(t)
∂hj(0)




= 0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1], (15)
since mi(0) > (
γ1
γfi
)δ (see Appendix A.2). A larger productivity gap results
in stronger spillovers and a faster catch up for the competitive fringe. Ceteris
paribus, the downward pressure on markups is more pronounced when the trade
partner is more productive.
2.2. Model Solution
Goods markets and labor market clearing conditions, and balanced trade
will determine the prices and wages simultaneously given the initial productivity
distributions and spillover equations.
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Labor market clearing implies
∫ 1
0
lidi = L. (16)








The initial productivity gap between the incumbent and its fringe is suffi-
ciently large; hence all incumbents are able to set monopoly prices in autarky.
Since the relative incumbent productivity is monotonically decreasing over time,
firm i switches from monopoly pricing to limit pricing at a particular point in
finite time. We define a non-decreasing function G(t) which captures the frac-




G(t) ≤ 1 , G(0) = 0 , ∂G(t)
∂t
≥ 0. (18)
In this case, at time t, 100G(t) percent of the firms will use limit pricing and
their prices will be different due to heterogeneous productivity distributions
across sectors. On the other hand, 100(1 − G(t)) percent of the firms will use
monopoly pricing. Given the symmetry among incumbents, the same prices are
observed if the fringe productivity is not binding, whereas prices are lower and
heterogeneous otherwise.
Using the balanced budget condition, goods and labor market clearing, we
find relative wage, w∗ ≡ w/w̄, of southern workers as9






















−ε > 1 for the firms whose fringe productivities are binding. So,
the integral on right hand side is greater than G(t) and the expression in square
brackets is larger than 1. Equation (19) shows that higher competition induced
by international trade unambiguously increases relative wages. To link this rela-
tionship formally to the moments of the markup distribution, let m̃i(t) represent
the observed markup relative to monopoly markups:
m̃i(t) =
 1 if i ∈ (G(t),1]mi(t) ε−1ε if i ∈ [0,G(t)] (20)














Equation (21) reveals that relative wage of the southern workers is inversely
related to average markup level since the second term on the right hand side is
homogenous of degree -1. As a result, higher competition leads to higher relative
wages for southern workers. Does the increase in relative wages also translate
into an increase in the relative consumption? The answer is not trivial due to
allocational effects of markup heterogeneity. Hence, labor allocation should be
characterized. The relative demand of incumbent k whose fringe is binding with





















; k ∈ [0, G(t)] , m ∈ (G(t), 1],
(22)
where the last two equalities follow from goods market equilibrium and the
symmetry among incumbent productivity. Although it is assumed that all active
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firms in the South are equally productive, international trade reveals underlying
institutional or technological differences among southern sectors and there is
continuous reallocation of labor, as apparent from (22). In order to evaluate
the resultant effect of the increase in relative wages and change in the market
structure across sectors, we solve for the labor allocated to each firm using the























, ∀k ∈ [0, G(t)], (24)





, ∀m ∈ (G(t), 1]. (25)
Inspection of (24) and (25) shows that lk > lm. Therefore, southern firms
with lower profitability are larger relative to more profitable firms. Using (19),





































Equation (27) summarizes the effects of trade and markup dispersion on
relative output of the South. The last term on the right hand side makes it
clear that markup distribution has a first order effect on the relative output. A
formal interpretation requires a definition of the efficient benchmark according
to which the current state of the economy is compared to.
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Definition 1. The potential output of the South is the maximum relative output










Proposition 1. When markup variation is positive, the relative output of the








Proof. We define zi(t) ≡ m̃i(t)1−ε. Then the numerator and the denominator

































For ε > 1, εε−1 > 1. By Lyapunov’s inequality, a generalized mean is increasing
in the exponent unless there is no variation in zi(t). Hence the multiplier is
strictly smaller than 1 and the relative output is smaller than the potential
value when the variance of the observed markups is positive.
Unless markups are equalized, firm level price distortions will be different
across southern sectors and the ones with lower profitability and marginal rev-
enue productivity will employ more labor. Hence, market allocation results in
a lower output level than the best possible case, which we interpret as misal-
location. The multiplier of the potential value in (29) measures how far the
domestic economy is away from its potential value. Hence, we can define the














Besides having level effects, misallocation induced by international trade
has also growth effects. If we log-linearize (29) and use (31), we find that
Ĉx− ˆ̄Cx = ( ε−1ε )(Ĥ −
ˆ̄H)− Ṁ(t) for 1−M(t) ≈ 1. Hence, the difference in the
observed growth rates of the frontier and laggard economies might understate
the convergence in physical labor productivity due to trade induced misalloca-
tion and we may observe a divergent pattern unless productivity gains dominate
allocational losses.
Using equation (31), it is theoretically possible to quantify misallocation once
we have a valid measure for the elasticity of substitution. However, one should
propose an empirically sound measure for the elasticity of substitution among
all commodities produced in a country to empirically analyze the determinants
of misallocation. Finding the empirical counterpart of such a variable requires
elaborate solution of obvious conceptual problems. Proposition 2 provides a
useful way to deal with this issue for our purposes:
Proposition 2. A mean-preserving spread on the observed markups; that is,
increasing the variation of observed markup distribution while keeping its mean
unchanged increases resource misallocation at the country level.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition-2 links the observed markup variation and country level resource
misallocation. It provides an intuitive way of quantifying misallocation by using
a non-parametric estimate of observed markup variation. We will use this result
while conducting the empirical tests of our model implications. Namely, we
analyze the effects of trade openness and the productivity of trade partners on
resource misallocation using the standard deviation of markups as a proxy for
resource misallocation.
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2.3. Remarks and Discussion
Before presenting the empirical tests of the model predictions, we will discuss
the validity of the spillover mechanism employed to model knowledge transfers
among trade partners, since it is of particular importance for the theoretical
consequences of our model. First, it is argued that the followers in terms of
productivity can benefit from the knowledge stock of leader firms in the form
of technological knowledge spillovers when they operate in integrated markets.
There is voluminous empirical work on the relationship between international
trade and productivity growth (e.g., Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe et al. (1997),
Keller (2002) and Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005)). Although there have been
skeptical concerns about positive effects of international trade on productivity
(e.g., Keller (2000)), Madsen (2007) shows that when a larger time span relative
to the existing studies is used, imports of knowledge constitute 93 percent of the
increase in TFP over the period 1870 to 2004 for OECD countries. Second, the
strength of spillovers is assumed to be an increasing function of the productivity
gap - labor productivity of the leader relative to the follower - between the
trading partners (e.g., Griffith et al. (2004), Salomon and Jin (2008)). Third,
the productivity gap which is relevant for international spillovers is defined
using aggregate productivity of the trade partner, hence it is argued that both
within sector and outside the sector foreign knowledge stock can contribute to
technology diffusion (see, Keller (2002)). Finally, we assume away other factors
which may affect the ability to make use of knowledge spillovers such as firms’
own R&D intensity. This modeling choice is not as restrictive as it first seems.
The R&D expenditure is only relevant for our purposes if its intensity differs
between the incumbent and the fringe. Even in this case, if this difference
is explained by the initial differences in productivity or can be captured by a
time-invariant multiplicative factor, our formulation is still valid. Also, we allow
for differences in the steady-state relative incumbent productivity ( γ1
γfi
) across
sectors in a general manner. Hence, we account for the possibility that the
effects of spillovers may have differential effects on competitive conduct across
sectors, be it dependent on the differences in R&D intensity, institutional setting
18
or nature of the production process.
3. Empirical Analysis
In the empirical part, we test the main prediction of the model regarding
the impact of international trade on resource misallocation, present evidence
that predicted relationship is present in the data and show that changes in the
productivity distribution as a reaction to trade with more productive trade part-
ners are consistent with the mechanism we suggested. The model predicts that
trading with more productive regions increases resource misallocation, which is
proxied by economy wide markup variation, for less productive countries. Hence,
it is expected that trading more with high productivity regions as a share of
GDP has a positive effect on country level markup variation for relatively less
productive economies and a less positive, if significant, effect for relatively more
productive economies since they are on average closer to the frontier. Regarding
the relevance of the knowledge transfers, it is tested whether trading more with
more productive regions increases average productivity while decreasing the pro-
ductivity gap at the sectoral level. For empirical purposes, the last prediction
is generalized to cases where there are more than two firms within a sector and
as a result productivity dispersion within 4-digit sectors is used instead of the
productivity gap.
To be able to test these predictions, we need three sets of data: (1) firm level
markups or profit margins and productivity variables, (2) bilateral trade data
at the country level to decompose openness with respect to the productivity
of the trade partner and (3) country level macroeconomic indicators to control
for other determinants of misallocation and productivity distribution which can
bias the estimates if omitted.
3.1. Firm level profitability and productivity
Bureau van Dijk provides detailed firm level financial data (AMADEUS
dataset) for a large set of European firms including the ones in relatively less pro-
ductive countries such as transition economies. Our sample consists of 2.039.139
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observations for 351.570 large scale10 European firms from 1992 to 2007 for
which profit margins are available.11,12 In this dataset, profit margins are com-
puted from the balance sheet entries of firms by computing the before tax profits
relative to turnover. We computed the standard deviation of the profit margins
(sdprma) for each country and year;13 then constructed a panel and only take
the countries for which profit margin is available for at least 50 firms. We end
up with 307 observations for 32 countries.
3.2. Trade Data and Macroeconomic Indicators
The macroeconomic indicators and merchandise trade data are taken from
UPenn World Tables 7.0 and UN Comtrade, respectively. Import and export
values are compiled by aggregating trade partners at the regional level. North
America (US and Canada), Japan and Western Europe are defined as the high
productivity region. Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) show that using nominal GDP
to evaluate the relative importance of trade with respect to overall economic
activity can be misleading in the presence of non-tradables. A decrease in the
relative prices of tradables followed by an expansion in trade openness results in
an underestimated openness level when the standard nominal openness measures
are used. Furthermore, less productive countries have virtually higher levels of
openness due to their lower relative price of non-tradables. Hence, they propose
real openness, which is the sum of imports and exports relative to purchasing
power parity (PPP) GDP, as a better measure of trade exposure. We use their
10Small or medium scale firms in less productive countries are systematically underrepre-
sented. To mitigate possible biases which can be introduced due to this issue, only large scale
firms are considered.
11We exclude 2008 and 2009 for which the data are available since there are abrupt changes
in the trade patterns due to recent economic downturn.
12A financial year starts from the 1st of July and lasts until the 30th of June of the next
year. Conventional calendar year is not used since many firms report financial reports after
the 1st of January. Alternative choices are not effective on the results presented here.
13Apart from the variation of profit margins, mean profit margin (meanprma), mean
turnover per employee (meantpe) and mean capital per employee variables (meancpe) are
created as relevant variables for the empirical analysis
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insight and construct the variable of interest (highshare) by dividing the sum
of imports and exports with the high productivity region by PPP GDP. Total
real openness (openr) including also service trade is constructed by multiplying
nominal openness in constant prices by the price level (GDP in exchange rate
US$ relative to GDP in PPP US$, which is also the real exchange rate) in UPenn
World Table 7.0.
3.3. Specifications and Results
3.3.1. Trade and misallocation
The objective is to test whether higher share of trade with more productive
trade partners increases economy wide markup variation only for less productive
countries. For this purpose, we estimate reduced-form models relating markup
variation (sdprma) to trade openness (openr) and share of openness with high
productivity region (highshare) for countries which are above and below the
median of PPP adjusted GDP per capita, separately.14,15 Using PPP adjusted
GDP per capita as a proxy for labor productivity, we expect a higher positive
impact of highshare on variation of the profit margins for below median income
14The threshold is the median PPP adjusted per capita GDP in 2006 in 2005 US$. To
prevent transitions from one group to the other, sample average income is computed for all
countries and the ones having a mean income level lower than the threshold are labeled as
below median income countries. Below median income countries are Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Mace-
donia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Above
median income countries are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
15This grouping of European countries is also consistent with the emphasis on limited
R&D intensity of southern economies in the theoretical part. In 2007, the per inhabitant
R&D expenditure of the business enterprise sector in below median income countries ranges
from 2.5 Euros (Bulgaria) to 29.3 Euros (Czech Republic) whereas it ranges from 67.8 Euros
(Italy) to 253.5 Euros (Germany) for above median income countries. The only exception in
our sample is Slovenia with a spending of 105.4 Euros per inhabitant on R&D while being
below the median income level.
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countries.16 In these estimations, we control for mean profit margin (mean-
prma), labor productivity (meantpe), real and nominal exchange rates (p and
xrat), share of government consumption in PPP GDP (cg), capital-labor ratio
and a set of country and year fixed effects. The inclusion of the average markup
is not to interpret the statistical or economic significance of this variable but
to capture the variation in the second moment of the profit margins trivially
driven by the changes in the first moment.17 Real exchange rate is added to con-
trol for cross-country differences in the relative price of non-tradable goods on
markup variation. Proxies for labor productivity (mean turnover per employee)
and capital-labor ratio (capital per employee) are added to our specifications
since they might bias the estimates if omitted. Share of government consump-
tion in PPP GDP (cg) is controlled for to capture the cross-country variation
in profitability driven by the differences in government size. Country and year
dummies are also included to control for country specific effects and the common
shocks across countries, respectively.
Table 1 presents the results for fixed effects (FE) panel estimations, for
below and above median income countries in the first and the second column,
respectively. It is seen that the joint effect of trade openness is insignificant at
sample averages for both groups of countries. On the other hand, redirecting
trade from low productivity regions to high productivity ones keeping total
openness constant increases economy wide variation of profit margins only for
below median income countries, which confirms the model predictions. Labor
16Considering our aim to measure the economy wide markup variation, there can be doubt
that the number of firms is not enough to capture the second moment of the profit margin
distribution for some country-year pairs. The median numbers of firms which are considered
in our analysis are 1431 and 2721 per year, for below and above median income countries,
respectively.
17All specifications are estimated also without the first monent of the markup distribution.
The results are similar, which is not surprising considering the insignificance of this variable in
benchmark estimations. The results are not reported here and can be found in the Appendix
for Referees.
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productivity and capital intensity are both negatively associated with markup
variation for below median income countries, which emphasizes the importance
of human and physical capital in improving economy wide allocative efficiency
for less developed economies.
We test the robustness of the observed relationship between trade composi-
tion and misallocation to different model specifications by adding the explana-
tory variables sequentially.18 Then, the same models are estimated for different
time periods by sequentially eliminating the initial year in the sample to check
whether the observed relationship is sensitive to the choice of time span.19 An-
other issue about our benchmark results is that cross country differences in
markup dispersion can be driven by the differences in the degree and/or pattern
of specialization across countries. As an example, it can be argued that a more
diversified economy should exhibit higher markup dispersion due to different
entry costs across industries or an agriculturally oriented economy will exhibit
lower levels of markup dispersion due to the relative uniformity of technology
inputs across establishments in that sector. We check this possibility by con-
trolling for the share of finance, agriculture, construction, retail trade, protech
(professional, scientific, and technical services), administration (administrative
and support and waste management and remediation services), and health care
in all observations for each country-year pair. These industries accomodate the
largest number of firms in US economy and our choice of industries is moti-
vated by this observation. Preliminary analysis shows that only the shares of
agriculture, protech and health care appear to be significant. Hence, we omit
the remaining sectors from our estimations not to lose identifying variation.
We also instrument our variable of interest (highshare) for possible endogeneity
18We only report the sequential estimations for below median income countries for the sake
of brevity. highshare remains to be non-positive in all specifications for above median income
countries.
19The results are similar until we end up with 2000-2007 sample. After this point, they
become weaker in terms of statistical significance due to smaller sample size. We do not report
them to save space and they are available upon request.
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and measurement issues using its first lead and the consumption share of GDP.
The consumption share of GDP is expected to be positively related to demand
for higher quality foreign products and it is expected that there is a correlation
between highshare and its first lead. To our knowledge there is no theoretical ar-
gument which defines causality from markup variation to future trade with high
productivity regions or consumption share of GDP. The formal tests for instru-
ment relevance and exogeneity approve the validity of these instruments. The
first stage F-statistic is 17.28 with a partial R2 of 0.347 and overidentification
test yields a J-statistic of 0.492 with a P-value of 0.483 for the least extended
specification where the average markup, openr, country and year fixed effects
are controlled for. The kurtosis of sdprma is 5.59. This implies a rather mild
effect of outliers on the estimates. Nevertheless, we address the issue of outliers
explicitly and estimate all specifications by using robust regression (RR), which
downweights the observations with larger residuals in an iterative manner (see
Rousseeuw et al. (1987) for a general description of this method).20
Table 2 presents the results for below median income countries. The first
seven columns are the estimates of FE panel models, the eighth column depicts
the IV estimation results and the last column presents the RR estimates for
the extended specification. The main message of the results in Table 2 and
the following robustness checks is that trade with more productive regions has
a positive and significant effect on markup variation only for less productive
economies and this result is not driven by model specification, measurement
errors, endogenous variation, industry composition or outliers and is robust to
the choice of time span. Besides being significant, the influence of highshare on
markup variation is quantitatively important. Using the figures in Table 2, it is
20The estimator used is readily implemented (rreg command) in Stata. It is robust to
outliers in the dependent variable and to bad leverage points. However, the estimates can be
distorted when there are clusters of outliers (Rousseeuw and Van Zomeren (1990)). To control
for this possibility, we use a second estimator (recently implemented by Verardi and Croux
(2009)) which is robust even to the existence of outlier clusters. The results are similar and
given in the Appendix for referees.
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found that one standard deviation increase in highshare leads to an increase of
0.31 to 1.77 standard deviations in sdprma for the period of 1992 to 2007. With
such a large effect on the markup variation, highshare is the most influential
factor among the determinants of resource misallocation.
3.3.2. Technology diffusion
In this part, we test whether trade with more productive regions contributes
to the mean labor productivity while decreasing the productivity gap among in-
cumbents operating in a given sector. For this purpose, we estimate models re-
lating the mean and the standard deviation of labor productivity at the sectoral
level for 4-digit sectors (meantpeS, sdtpeS) to the openness variables (openr,
highshare), real and nominal exchange rates (p,xrat), sectoral and country level
capital-labor ratios (meancpeS,meancpe) controlling for year, sector, country
fixed effects and industry specific trends. Preliminary analysis shows that the
distributions of meantpeS and sdtpeS are heavy-tailed and quite prone to out-
liers with substantial kurtosis of 2216.04 and 424.98 for below median coun-
tries, respectively. In such cases, ordinary least square methods yield strongly
distorted estimates. For that reason, the models are estimated using robust
regression method.21
Table 3 and 4 present the estimation results which support the relationship
between trade composition and sectoral productivity distribution predicted by
the model. Trade with more productive regions is positively related to aver-
age sectoral productivity and negatively associated to the sectoral productivity
distribution, for below median income countries. Hence, both the existence
of spillovers and productivity convergence seem to be empirically valid in our
21The same models are estimated using OLS where the variables with high kurtosis are
logged to check whether the standard OLS estimations yield a similar picture. While taking
logs decreases the kurtosis and downweights the outliers, it does so in a specific and rather
restrictive manner. Still, they constitute the standard alternatives to our benchmark method
and can be useful for comparison purposes. The findings are in line with the benchmark
results and reported in the Appendix for referees.
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Table 1: Variation in Profit Margins and Trade



















Robust standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is the standard deviation of profit margins.
Year and country fixed effects are included.
Median income is 23412.07 US Dollars (base year 2005)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: Variation in Profit Margins and Trade in Below Median Income Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Variables FE FE FE FE FE FE FE IV RR
meanprma -0.146 -0.144 -0.189∗ -0.158 -0.190 -0.193 -0.132 -0.268∗ -0.180∗∗
(0.0970) (0.0974) (0.0970) (0.136) (0.130) (0.135) (0.131) (0.150) (0.0751)
openr -0.0895∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗ -0.0892∗∗∗ -0.0683 -0.0795 -0.0813 -0.0262 -0.166∗ -0.0126
(0.0205) (0.0318) (0.0305) (0.0414) (0.0507) (0.0580) (0.0392) (0.0904) (0.0298)
highshare 0.189∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.351∗∗ 0.0799∗
(0.0434) (0.0504) (0.0485) (0.0565) (0.0658) (0.0752) (0.0508) (0.164) (0.0442)
p 0.00952 -0.0107 0.0347 0.0417 0.0421 0.0608 0.129∗∗ 0.0189
(0.0556) (0.0541) (0.0459) (0.0488) (0.0492) (0.0423) (0.0600) (0.0314)
xrat -0.00280∗∗∗ -0.00278∗∗∗ -0.0573∗∗∗ -0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0186 -0.0252∗ -0.0309∗∗
(0.000833) (0.000906) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0119)
meantpe -11.46 -55.99∗∗∗ -55.80∗∗∗ -42.33∗∗ -34.52∗ -36.66∗∗∗
(8.874) (13.14) (13.56) (16.12) (20.12) (10.99)
meancpe -0.0810∗∗ -0.0809∗∗ -0.0905∗ -0.0908∗ -0.0570∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0442) (0.0511) (0.0250)
cg -0.0333 0.584∗ 0.448 0.400∗∗
(0.242) (0.309) (0.415) (0.180)
Industry Composition No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 155 155 155 144 137 137 114 100 114
R2 0.301 0.302 0.321 0.271 0.382 0.382 0.591 0.583 0.964
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the standard deviation of profit margins.
For IV estimation, the instruments are valid with a partial R2 of 0.277 and a J-statistic of 0.411
Year and country fixed effects are included. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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sample.
Table 3: Average Sectoral Productivity of Below Median Income Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables RR RR RR RR RR RR
openr -1.885∗∗∗ -3.036∗∗∗ -3.044∗∗∗ -3.003∗∗∗ -2.720∗∗∗ -2.479∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.325) (0.326) (0.359) (0.503) (0.493)
highshare 2.705∗∗∗ 4.027∗∗∗ 4.033∗∗∗ 4.009∗∗∗ 5.130∗∗∗ 3.972∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.512) (0.512) (0.530) (0.753) (0.738)
p 1.708∗∗∗ 1.702∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗∗ 2.132∗∗∗ 2.342∗∗∗
(0.399) (0.399) (0.406) (0.589) (0.578)
xrat -0.0198 -9.344∗∗∗ -5.878∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗
(0.0281) (0.232) (0.377) (0.370)
meancpeS 0.0243 1.810∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.186) (0.187)
Industry Composition No No No No Yes Yes
Industry Trends No No No No No Yes
Observations 19307 19307 19307 19098 17254 17254
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average sectoral turnover
per employee at the 4-digit level.Sector, year, and country fixed effects are included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4. Remarks and Discussion
3.4.1. An alternative explanation: Firm selection
An important alternative explanation which may result in similar changes
in the sectoral productivity distributions is the exit of least productive firms
as a reaction to higher trade exposure and competition. While theories of firm
selection do not underscore the relative productivity of the trade partner, they
are still natural alternatives to be evaluated. To begin with, we observe that
only 0.37 percent of the firms did not provide a financial report in the last two
years and firm exit seems to be infrequent among large firms. However, in this
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Table 4: Sectoral Productivity Dispersion of Below Median Income Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables RR RR RR RR RR RR
meantpeS 1.333∗∗∗ 1.333∗∗∗ 1.333∗∗∗ 1.333∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗
(0.0000237) (0.0000237) (0.0000237) (0.0000238) (0.0000295) (0.0000306)
openr 0.885∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗
(0.160) (0.205) (0.205) (0.223) (0.300) (0.309)
highshare -1.309∗∗∗ -1.455∗∗∗ -1.452∗∗∗ -1.627∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗ -0.910∗∗
(0.278) (0.323) (0.323) (0.329) (0.434) (0.448)
p -0.188 -0.187 -0.307 -0.235 0.0934
(0.243) (0.243) (0.245) (0.341) (0.353)
xrat -0.00371 -1.845∗∗∗ 0.0933 3.221∗∗∗
(0.0183) (0.183) (0.276) (0.285)
meancpeS 1.436∗∗∗ 1.565∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.250) (0.262)
Industry Composition No No No No Yes Yes
Industry Trends No No No No No Yes
Observations 15919 15919 15919 15855 14535 14535
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the sectoral standard deviation of turnover per employee
within 4-digit sectors. Sector, year, and country fixed effects are included. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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figure it is possible to miss some firms which are practically inoperative but
still reporting due to legal reasons. For that reason, we count the firms which
lose more than 50 percent of their total sales from one year to the next. Only
2.4 percent of the time, firms experience such a large shrinkage in their sales
volumes while being still operative. It is also likely that measurement errors can
account for a significant share of these observed sales losses. These observations
do not invalidate the exit hypothesis but may imply that possible shrinkage
in the market shares of least productive firms does not translate into exits or
sharp declines in sales volumes. Fortunately, in such a case exit and spillover
mechanisms can be differentiated because they lead to contrasting patterns in
industry concentration. If the least productive firms are not completely driven
out of the market but the underlying mechanism is working, exit hypothesis pre-
dicts increasing inequality in market shares whereas spillovers and productivity
convergence lead to a more homogeneous distribution of sales across operating
firms. To be able to observe which prediction is empirically more grounded
in our sample, we construct the Herfindahl index for each country, sector, and
year to investigate the relationship between highshare and industry concentra-
tion (Table 5). The first five columns present the results for OLS regressions,
the sixth column shows the IV estimation where highshare is instrumented with
its first lead and the consumptionshare of PPP GDP, and the last column pro-
vides robust regression results to control for the effects of outliers on coefficient
estimates. Despite being imprecisely estimated in 1 out of 8 cases, highshare
has a negative effect on industry concentration in all cases. This finding is in
line with the expected effects of technology diffusion on industry structure.
3.4.2. Endogenous labor supply
A possible extension of our model would be to incorporate labor supply deci-
sion of individuals. This point is particularly important since increasing relative
wages for southern workers alter the value of employment relative to leisure and
labor supply would increase as a result of higher competition induced by trade.
This increase in effective labor supply would enhance the productive capacity
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Table 5: Industry Concentration and Trade
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV RR
openr 1.090∗∗ 0.195 0.224 0.328 0.247 0.184 0.296 0.507
(0.434) (0.573) (0.573) (0.659) (0.650) (0.649) (1.444) (0.597)
highshare -4.919∗∗∗ -3.766∗∗∗ -3.737∗∗∗ -2.163∗∗ -2.022∗∗ -2.101∗∗ -2.437 -3.335∗∗∗
(0.794) (0.943) (0.943) (0.972) (0.964) (0.968) (2.289) (0.882)
p 1.801∗∗ 1.906∗∗∗ 2.828∗∗∗ 2.897∗∗∗ 2.994∗∗∗ 3.028∗∗∗ 2.642∗∗∗
(0.720) (0.725) (0.747) (0.743) (0.745) (1.102) (0.674)
xrat 0.0503∗∗∗ -0.279 -0.305 -0.306 -0.103 -0.348
(0.0158) (0.481) (0.480) (0.484) (0.574) (0.386)
meancpeS 0.493∗∗ 0.506∗∗ 0.556∗∗ 0.532∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.215) (0.221) (0.219) (0.237)
meantpeS 19.17 36.99 65.26 25.69
(62.62) (58.21) (57.80) (43.50)
Observations 23218 23218 23218 19229 19165 19165 16518 19165
R2 0.416 0.417 0.417 0.490 0.501 0.513 0.002 0.579
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit level
multiplied by 1000 (for demonstrational purposes).Year, sector, and country fixed effects are included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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of the South similar to knowledge diffusion and lead to a higher potential output
value. Nevertheless, our main proposition is still valid in the sense that as long
as markup variation is inflated by trade, these potential gains would be partly
utilized and actual output would still be lower than the best possible case.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a theoretical model in which opening to inter-
national trade triggers technological knowledge spillovers from the productive
North to the South characterized by lower labor productivity and limited ca-
pacity to innovate. These spillovers contribute to the common knowledge stock
of the South from which both the incumbents and their competitors can benefit.
As a reaction to higher trade with more productive regions, mean labor pro-
ductivity increases whereas the productivity variation diminishes within each
sector. The changes in sectoral productivity distribution decrease the market
power of sectoral leaders and exert a downward pressure on markups. These
pro-competitive effects materialize asymmetrically due to differences in produc-
tivity distribution across sectors. As a consequence, trade with more productive
economies inflates markup dispersion across sectors and introduces resource mis-
allocation for the South. These model predictions are tested for a large sample
of European countries between 1992 and 2007. The main econometric analysis
and following robustness checks show that trading more with more productive
partners (1) inflates economy wide markup variation (2) raises mean labor pro-
ductivity, and (3) decreases productivity dispersion within 4-digit sectors. These
results are in line with the model predictions.
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Appendix A. Relative incumbent productivity











.22 Then, the growth of ai(t) is
given by:
âi(t) = (1− θ + δ)ĥi(t)− δĥj
ĥi(t) can be found by dividing both sides of the law of motion for incumbent
productivity (10) by hi(t) and given by ĥi(t) = γ1a
−1
i (t). The northern produc-
tivity is constant and exogenous and we have a differential equation for ai(t):
ȧi(t) = (1− θ + δ)γ1 − δĥjai(t)
and
ai(t) =
(1− θ + δ)γ1
δĥj
+ (ai(0)−
(1− θ + δ)γ1
δĥj
)e−δĥjt (A.1)
Similarly, b(t) is found as:
bi(t) =
(1− θ + δ)γfi
δĥj
+ (bi(0)−
(1− θ + δ)γfi
δĥj
)e−δĥjt (A.2)
where ai(0) and bi(0) are the initial values of the corresponding functions.















For endogenous growth case (θ = 1) and using the definitions of gi(t) and
fi(t) given in the main text, (A.3) becomes:























Appendix A.2. Productivity of the trade partner
In this part, we will show that the sectoral markups are decreasing functions
of the initial productivity of the trade partner while this effect approaches to
zero in the long-run. Using eq. (12):
mi(t) =










Then, the partial derivative of sectoral markup with respect to the initial

















































< 0 ∀t ∈ [0,∞)
The last inequality holds since 1 < ( γ1
γfi
) < ( γ1
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Appendix B. General equilibrium
In this part, we will explicitly present the general equilibrium solution of our




































, ∀i ∈ (G(t), 1] (B.3)
Total expenditure should be equal to total output for each country. Using








































Dividing (B.4) by (B.6) , multiplying and dividing the numerator with εε−1
hi
w









































































































































The second equality follows from the definition of mi(t). Using the symmetry
among incumbents and the definition of m̃i(t) yields equation (27) in the main
text.
Appendix C. Misallocation and the markup variation
Let f(x) = x1−ε and g(x) = x−ε.23 Note that f ′′(x) = ε(ε− 1)x(−ε−1) > 0
and g′′(x) = ε(ε+1)x(−ε−2) > 0. Hence, f(x) and g(x) are strictly convex since
ε > 1. Using these two functions, we can rewrite the misallocation function as
follows24:




Let a be a random variable with mean 0 and uncorrelated to m̃, i.e., E[a|m̃] =
























23In this section, time is dropped for ease of notation.




ε > 1 and εε−1 > 1.
Now, we approximate the misallocation function by the second order Taylor
series approximations of f(m̃+ a) and g(m̃+ a) around the point m̃:
f(m̃+ a) ≈ f(m̃) + f ′(m̃)a+ f
′′(m̃)a2
2







E[f(m̃)] + E[f ′(m̃)a] + E[ f
′′(m̃)a2
2 ]




E[f(m̃)] + E[f ′(m̃)]E[a] + E[f
′′(m̃)]E[a2]
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The first equality follows from the zero correlation between a and m̃. The
second equality holds because the unconditional mean of a is 0, the third
equality uses the explicit values of the second derivatives for f(x) and g(x)
evaluated at m̃; finally, the inequality holds because (ε + 1) > (ε − 1) and
E[m̃(−ε−1)]/E[m̃(−ε−2)] < E[m̃(1−ε)]/E[m̃−ε] = E[f(m̃)]/E[g(m̃)] .
Appendix D. Appendix for Referees (not intended for publication)
Appendix D.1. Trade and Misallocation
Appendix D.1.1. Without the first moment
In this section, we estimate the same models in section 3.3.1 without con-
trolling for the first moment of the markup distribution. Results are similar,
which is not surprising considering the insignificance of the mean markup level
in benchmark estimations.
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Table D.6: Variation in Profit Margins and Trade in Below Median Income Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Variables FE FE FE FE FE FE FE IV RR
openr -0.0753∗∗∗ -0.0837∗∗ -0.0774∗∗ -0.0641 -0.0736 -0.0719 -0.0210 -0.150∗ -0.0477∗
(0.0248) (0.0362) (0.0353) (0.0445) (0.0547) (0.0590) (0.0375) (0.0845) (0.0267)
highshare 0.158∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.119∗ 0.136∗ 0.134∗ 0.0962∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0512) (0.0509) (0.0573) (0.0679) (0.0723) (0.0430) (0.147) (0.0386)
p 0.0166 0.00283 0.0541 0.0638 0.0632 0.0671 0.133∗∗ 0.0711∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0568) (0.0431) (0.0446) (0.0448) (0.0400) (0.0587) (0.0282)
xrat -0.00213∗∗ -0.00210∗∗ -0.0543∗∗∗ -0.0540∗∗∗ -0.0194 -0.0258∗ -0.0237∗∗
(0.000884) (0.000854) (0.0138) (0.0152) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0108)
meantpe -8.519 -50.28∗∗∗ -50.55∗∗∗ -41.45∗∗ -35.01 -14.51
(8.047) (11.90) (12.78) (15.26) (21.50) (9.912)
meancpe -0.0766∗∗ -0.0767∗∗ -0.0919∗ -0.0968∗ -0.0347
(0.0274) (0.0283) (0.0456) (0.0559) (0.0226)
cg 0.0332 0.575∗ 0.496 0.343∗∗
(0.218) (0.286) (0.421) (0.162)
Industry Composition No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 155 155 155 144 137 137 114 100 114
R2 0.289 0.290 0.302 0.258 0.364 0.364 0.583 0.577 0.971
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the standard deviation of profit margins. For IV estimation, the instruments are
valid with a partial R2 of 0.296, F-statistic of 9.40, AP(2) of 24.50 and a J-statistic of 0.317. Year and country fixed effects are included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix D.1.2. Full IV estimates
In the main part of the text, we reported only the IV estimates for the most
extended specification in section 3.3.1. In this part, we replicate Table 2 of the
main text by instrumenting highshare with its first lead and the consumption
share of PPP GDP (cc) in all specifications. Instruments are always exogenous;
underidentification is rejected at 1% in all speicifications and relatively high
F-statistics provide confidence in the strength of the instruments.
Appendix D.1.3. Sensitivity to the threshold
Our benchmark estimations use data on countries with at least 50 large
firms per year. In this section, we will show that benchmark results are robust
to this choice by replicating Table 2 using the country-year pairs with at least
200 observations. Highshare remains to be positive and strongly significant,
except the last column where the coefficient estimate of highshare misses to be
significant at 10% having a P -value of 0.123 with a t-statistic of 1.56. This is
probably due to loss of observations as a result of the higher threshold and rapid
downweighting of observations with larger residuals and in some cases equating
their weight to zero in Robust Regression method.
Appendix D.1.4. Cluster of outliers
Our benchmark Robust Regression estimator might miss to detect the cluster
of outliers. This can be an issue since we have a panel and observe countries over
time. To control for this possibility, we use the mmregress routine implemented
by Verardi and Croux (2009) in Stata. There is a trade off between efficiency
and the bias of estimates, which is controlled by the efficiency level chosen. To
be on the safe side, we use the least efficient estimator which also yields the
least biased estimates. It is seen that despite using the least efficient estimator,
highshare is positively related to markup dispersion and sigificant at 1% in all
cases, except the least extended specification where the effect is still positive.
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Table D.7: Variation in Profit Margins and Trade
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variables IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
meanprma -0.268∗∗ -0.292∗∗ -0.337∗∗ -0.304∗ -0.303∗ -0.347∗∗ -0.268∗
(0.131) (0.141) (0.139) (0.161) (0.170) (0.160) (0.150)
openr -0.237∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗ -0.166∗
(0.0747) (0.129) (0.129) (0.150) (0.109) (0.111) (0.0904)
highshare 0.475∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗
(0.138) (0.206) (0.206) (0.226) (0.175) (0.182) (0.164)
p 0.124 0.107 0.200∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.129∗∗
(0.0867) (0.0862) (0.0970) (0.0724) (0.0707) (0.0600)
xrat -0.00234∗∗ -0.00193∗ -0.0649∗∗∗ -0.0692∗∗∗ -0.0252∗
(0.000976) (0.00101) (0.0181) (0.0185) (0.0147)
meantpe 16.05 -47.58∗∗ -47.03∗∗ -34.52∗
(20.17) (18.61) (19.36) (20.12)




Industry composition No No No No No No Yes
Underidentification
Kleibergen-Paap LM 13.22 12.01 12.14 10.99 14.31 13.24 8.85
P-value 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.012
Weak identification
F-statistic 17.28 10.01 9.87 8.74 14.32 13.44 7.24
Partial R2 0.347 0.234 0.235 0.227 0.305 0.285 0.277
AP(2) 38.01 21.92 22.48 20.14 34.24 32.50 19.16
Validity
J-statistic 0.492 0.351 0.206 0.032 0.000 0.003 0.411
Observations 138 138 138 127 120 120 100
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the standard deviation of profit margins. Year dummies and
country fixed effects are included. Highshare is instrumented by its first lead and the consumption share of PPP GDP.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.8: Variation in Profit Margins and Trade (Threshold=200)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Variables FE FE FE FE FE FE FE IV RR
meanprma -0.126 -0.120 -0.183 -0.254∗∗ -0.172∗ -0.190∗∗ -0.185∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗
(0.0846) (0.0845) (0.111) (0.108) (0.0844) (0.0802) (0.0835) (0.0859) (0.0750)
openr -0.0466∗∗ -0.0558∗ -0.0500 -0.0401 -0.0386 -0.0232 -0.0266 -0.0923∗ -0.00793
(0.0212) (0.0294) (0.0288) (0.0248) (0.0239) (0.0229) (0.0264) (0.0540) (0.0296)
highshare 0.158∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.0886∗∗∗ 0.0909∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.0688
(0.0410) (0.0457) (0.0417) (0.0363) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0391) (0.0932) (0.0441)
p 0.0202 -0.00479 0.0115 0.00912 0.0105 0.0249 0.0588∗ 0.0222
(0.0318) (0.0300) (0.0332) (0.0340) (0.0311) (0.0329) (0.0349) (0.0304)
xrat -0.00211∗∗∗ -0.00267∗∗∗ -0.0465∗∗∗ -0.0403∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗ -0.0405∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗∗
(0.000523) (0.000671) (0.00668) (0.00637) (0.00713) (0.00813) (0.0113)
meantpe -13.06∗ -61.31∗∗∗ -62.98∗∗∗ -44.36∗∗∗ -36.79∗∗∗ -39.90∗∗∗
(6.103) (10.17) (10.81) (8.579) (8.953) (10.67)
meancpe -0.0939∗∗∗ -0.0965∗∗∗ -0.0929∗∗∗ -0.0845∗∗∗ -0.0869∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0166) (0.0198) (0.0225) (0.0269)
cg 0.320∗ 0.255 0.117 0.429∗∗
(0.165) (0.175) (0.221) (0.181)
Industry Composition No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 126 126 126 120 113 113 109 95 107
R2 0.368 0.369 0.395 0.327 0.512 0.528 0.696 0.715 0.970
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the standard deviation of profit margins. Year dummies and country fixed effects are included.
In IV estimation, highshare is instrumented by its first lead and the consumption share of PPP GDP. Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is 8.009, the partial
R2 is 0.226, AP(2) is 14.10 and the J-statistic is 0.778. The sample consists of the country-year pairs with at least 200 large firms of which profit margin
is available. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.9: Variation in Profit Margins and Trade (Cluster of Outliers)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Variables RR RR RR RR RR RR RR
meanprma 0.0180 0.144∗∗∗ 0.0394 -0.000345 0.131∗∗∗ -0.0580∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.0771) (0.0428) (0.0435) (0.0400) (0.0243) (0.0187) (0.0234)
openr 0.0107 -0.0173∗∗ -0.0121 -0.00665 -0.0240 0.00868 -0.0265∗∗
(0.00897) (0.00791) (0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0166) (0.0178) (0.0126)
highshare 0.0341 0.0728∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0715∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗
(0.0223) (0.0127) (0.0201) (0.0213) (0.0165) (0.0246) (0.0147)
p 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗ 0.0421∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗ -0.0180 0.0551∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0151) (0.0174) (0.0102) (0.0119) (0.0130)
xrat -0.00104∗∗∗ 0.000789∗∗ -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗
(0.000272) (0.000355) (0.00180) (0.00253) (0.00450)
meantpe -1.436 -56.49∗∗∗ -50.39∗∗∗ -20.10∗∗∗
(4.161) (4.323) (5.290) (6.130)




Industry Composition No No No No No No Yes
Observations 155 155 155 144 137 137 114
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the standard deviation of profit margins. Year dummies and
country fixed effects are included. The coefficients are estimated by the S-estimator which yields the least biased estimates
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix D.2. Average Sectoral Productivity
The distributions of average sectoral productivity and sectoral productivity
variation are heavy-tailed with substantial kurtosis. In such cases, OLS esti-
mates are distorted. As the benchmark, we use Robust Regression to deal with
this issue. In this section, we will show that the relationship between aver-
age productivity and highshare is not driven by this estimation method, which
provides further confidence in our findings. We take the natural logarithm of
meantpeS, sdtpeS and meancpeS, which have high kurtosis and estimate the
same specifications in section 3.3.2. While taking logs decreases the kurtosis
and downweights the outliers, it does so in a specific and rather restrictive man-
ner. Still, they constitute the standard alternatives to our benchmark method
and can be useful for comparison purposes. Table D.10 and D.11 present the
estimation results for average sectoral productivity and sectoral productivity
dispersion, respectively, for below median income countries. It is seen that re-
sults from the log-log specification are in line with the benchmark results except
the fact that the effect of highshare on sectoral productivity dispersion becomes
significant after controlling for sectoral capital intensity while being negative in
all cases as predicted. This finding implies that sectoral capital intensity is pos-
itively associated with both trade with high productivity regions, and sectoral
productivity dispersion and it should be controlled for to prevent biases in the
estimates.
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Table D.10: Average Sectoral Productivity of Below Median Income Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
openr -0.0109∗∗∗ -0.0113∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0141∗∗∗
(0.00187) (0.00216) (0.00215) (0.00225) (0.00241) (0.00245)
highshare 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗
(0.00377) (0.00381) (0.00379) (0.00380) (0.00360) (0.00365)
p 0.000809 0.000790 0.00385 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00279) (0.00279) (0.00283) (0.00317) (0.00320)
xrat -0.000210 -0.00298∗ -0.00582∗∗ -0.00605∗∗
(0.000153) (0.00161) (0.00241) (0.00243)
lnmeancpeS 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗
(0.00665) (0.00780) (0.00800)
Industry Composition No No No No Yes Yes
Industry Trends No No No No No Yes
Observations 19307 19307 19307 19098 17254 17254
Dependent variable is the log of mean turnover per employee within 4-digit industries. Year, country and industry
fixed effects are included in all specifications. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in paranthesis
and clustered at the industry level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.11: Sectoral Productivity Dispersion of Below Median Income Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
lnmeantpeS 1.094∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0164)
openr 0.00337∗∗ 0.00528∗∗∗ 0.00559∗∗∗ 0.00768∗∗∗ 0.00476∗∗ 0.00559∗∗∗
(0.00151) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00211) (0.00204) (0.00207)
highshare -0.000799 -0.00324 -0.00339 -0.00796∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗
(0.00263) (0.00289) (0.00290) (0.00295) (0.00303) (0.00307)
p -0.00364∗ -0.00354∗ -0.00210 0.00694∗∗∗ 0.00646∗∗∗
(0.00194) (0.00194) (0.00196) (0.00212) (0.00217)
xrat 0.000614∗∗∗ -0.00114 -0.00303∗ -0.00295∗
(0.000169) (0.00177) (0.00175) (0.00168)
lnmeancpeS 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗∗
(0.00395) (0.00441) (0.00441)
Industry Composition No No No No Yes Yes
Industry Trends No No No No No Yes
Observations 15919 15919 15919 15855 14535 14535
Dependent variable is the log of standard deviation of turnover per employee within 4-digit industries. Year, country and
industry fixed effects are included in all specifications. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in paranthesis
and clustered at the industry level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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